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ABSTRACT

Federal and state reporters are filled with examples of lopsided

arbitration agreements drafted by employers with the apparent intent of
discouraging employees from successfully bringing valid claims.

The

case reporters contain far fewer examples of employment dispute
resolution programs that are carefully designed to ensure that employees
receive a fundamentally fair forum for the resolution of their
employment disputes, for the obvious reason that employees are less
likely to challenge these programs.
Similarly, most scholarly
commentary focuses on the overall merits and demerits of employment
arbitration, or on problems posed by particular provisions often found in
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employment arbitration agreements, but not on employment dispute
resolution programs that are designed with an eye toward employee
fairness. Both the case law and the legal commentary, therefore, provide
an arguably distorted picture of extant employment dispute resolution
programs-from these perspectives, all the apples look rotten.
This Article begins from the premise that much can be learned from
closely examining a well-drafted and well-implemented employment
dispute resolution program. Such a program can (1) provide scrupulous
employers with a model for drafting fair, ethical, and enforceable dispute
resolution programs; (2) provide a benchmark to courts in their decisions
of whether to enforce other employment dispute resolution programs;
and (3) serve as a reminder that not all the arbitral apples are rotten.
This Article examines in detail the Dispute Resolution Program of
Anheuser-Busch, and finds that it is possible for an employment dispute
resolution program culminating in binding arbitration simultaneously to
serve (1) the employer's goal of containing employment litigation costs,
(2) the employee's goal of access to a fair forum for resolving
employment disputes, and (3) both parties' goal of promoting the nonadversarial resolution of employment disputes.
The findings of this Article are particularly important now that
Congress appears increasingly likely to consider statutory amendments
prohibiting pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements. This Article
should not, however, be taken as a blanket endorsement of employment
arbitration. We argue merely that employment arbitration can be fair to
employees, not that employment arbitration is necessarily, or even
usually, fair.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since arbitration of individual statutory employment claims
exploded onto the scene in 1991,1 legal commentators have debated the
merits and demerits of employment arbitration. Proponents, such as
Samuel Estreicher, have argued that arbitration provides dispute
resolution access to low- and middle-income employees who otherwise
would not find legal representation and for whom judicial resolution
therefore is not an option.2 Critics, such as Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
have argued that arbitration is a form of second-class justice, the modem
equivalent of the yellow dog contract, particularly when employers 3foist
lopsided agreements upon employees as a condition of employment.

1. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN

EMPLOYMENT 1-2 (1997) (describing the early years of employment arbitration).
2. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute
Employment ArbitrationAgreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001).
3. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1996) [hereinafter
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Federal and state case reporters are filled with examples of lopsided
employment arbitration agreements. Examples include agreements that
waive the employee's right to recover punitive damages 4 and attorneys'
fees,5 cap the amount of consequential damages well below the amount
permitted by statute, impose shortened statutes of limitation,' impose
filing fees and other prohibitive costs on would-be claimants, require
employees and consumers to submit their claims to arbitration while
leaving the company free to litigate, 9 forbid class actions, 10 restrict or
eliminate discovery,"
and give the company unilateral authority to
12
appoint arbitrators.
The case reporters contain far fewer examples of employment
dispute resolution programs (often culminating in binding arbitration)
that are carefully designed to ensure that employees receive a
fundamentally fair forum for the resolution of their employment
disputes.1 3 This is partly for the obvious reason that employees are less
likely to challenge these programs, and partly because when a dispute
resolution program is challenged the judicial focus is not on the "fair"
parts of the program, but on the questionable parts that may render the
program unenforceable. 14 Similarly, most scholarly commentary focuses
Mandatory Arbitration]; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,960 (1999) [hereinafter Rustic Justice].
4. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2003)
(striking arbitration agreement that, among other things, limited damages to reinstatement and "net
pecuniary damages").
5. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1994).
6. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
bane) (agreement imposed a one-year cap on back pay, a two-year cap on front pay, and a $5000
cap on punitive damages in most cases); Pellow v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. N. Am., LLC., No. 0573815, 2006 WL 2540947, at *8 n.7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2006).
7. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003);
Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266-67 (striking arbitration provision that, among other things, required
employees to notify the employer "within thirty days of the event providing the basis of the
claims"); Conway v. Stryker Med. Div., No. 4:05-CV-40, 2006 WL 1008670, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Apr. 18, 2006).
8. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1177.
9. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 675 (Cal.

2000).
10. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 560 (Cal. 2007).
II.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786-87 (9th Cir.
2002).
12. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
13. A sampling of cases from various state and federal reports, concerning employment
dispute resolution programs, yield few results. See. e.g., id. at 935-41; Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694.
14. See Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Anheuser-Busch Cos. (January 3, 2002) in CPR INSTIT. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, How
Companies Manage Employment Disputes: A Compendium of Leading Corporate Employment
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on the overall merits and demerits of employment arbitration, or on
problems posed by particular provisions often found in employment
arbitration agreements, but not on employment dispute resolution
programs that are designed with an eye toward employee fairness.15
Both the case law and the legal commentary, therefore, provide an
arguably distorted picture of extant employment dispute resolution
programs-from a worm's-eye view, all the apples look rotten.
This Article begins from the premise that much can be learned from
closely examining a well-drafted and well-implemented employment
dispute resolution program. Such a program can provide scrupulous
employers with a model for drafting fair, ethical, and enforceable dispute
resolution programs. 1 6 It also can provide a benchmark to courts in their
decisions of whether to enforce other employment dispute resolution
programs. Finally, it can serve as a reminder that not all the arbitral
apples are rotten. Ultimately, the purpose of this Article is to assess
whether an employment dispute resolution program culminating in
binding arbitration can simultaneously (1) serve the employer's goal of
containing employment litigation costs, (2) serve the employee's goal of
access to a fair forum for resolving employment disputes, and (3) serve
both parties' goal of promoting the non-adversarial resolution of
employment disputes.

II. WHY ANHEUSER-BUSCH?
In 2002, Richard R. Ross, Senior Associate General Counsel of
Anheuser-Busch, was interviewed in a book published by the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution ("CPR") for
his role in creating the Anheuser-Busch Dispute Resolution Program
("DRP").17 Ross stated:
The enforceability of these programs will always be an issue. My

Programs app. at 55 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 2, at 560, 563 (focusing on policy debates that influence
the Justices in making their decisions in employment arbitration litigation); Mandatory Arbitration,
supra note 3, at 1017-18 (giving an example of how employers impose control over employees by
requiring their acceptance of a biased arbitration agreement as a requisite part of employment).
16. The word "fair" is used throughout this piece to assess dispute resolution programs. We
use the word as an excluder that encompasses all the things we mean by unfair, bad faith, no cause,
and the like. When we say "fair," we use that as shorthand to say that a dispute resolution program
does not contain any of the procedures that courts repeatedly have identified as unfair, such as no
discovery, high fees, a biased pool of arbitrators, and the like.
17. Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
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philosophy on that is first, you cannot play games with these programs.
If you try to use an employment ADR program to limit legal exposure
or employee rights or remedies, you are going to get shot down.
Second, no matter how fair and reasonable the program, there will
always be some risk that a particular court will not enforce it....
Besides, the true key to a good employment ADR program is not legal
enforceability. The key to a good program is whether it has sufficient
credibility in the eyes of the employees that they willingly use it. If
you can get your
program to that level, you don't have to worry about
18
enforceability.
Ross's approach to the DRP thus appeared to be consistent with the
approach that one of the authors of this Article has been advocating for
several years: employers adopting employment arbitration programs
should "bend over backwards to formulate fair employment arbitration
procedures."'1 9
In spring 2007, at a conference hosted by the National Academy of
Arbitrators and the Chicago-Kent College of Law Institute for Law and
the Workplace, 2 ° the same author of this Article met several mediators
and arbitrators who had worked on cases originating from the AnheuserBusch DRP.
The mediators and arbitrators uniformly described
Anheuser-Busch as going the extra mile to ensure that employees
received both procedural fairness and reasonable substantive outcomes.
This anecdotal evidence seemed to indicate that the Anheuser-Busch
DRP tended to be fair to employees, not only on paper, but also in
practice.
Of course, a handful of anecdotal reports cannot serve as the basis
for concluding that the Anheuser-Busch DRP yields procedural and
substantive justice in every case, or even that it does so more often than
the civil litigation it is designed to replace. However, these reports,
together with the ADR philosophy of the General Counsel responsible
for implementing and administering the DRP, led the authors to
conclude that the Anheuser-Busch DRP likely would be one of the more
pro-employee extant employment dispute resolution programs.

18.
19.

Id. app. at 55.
See, e.g., Rick Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment Arbitration in the

Nonunion Sector, 45 LAB. L.J. 627, 634 (1994).
20. Editor's Note, Papersfrom the NationalAcademy ofArbitrators Conference, "Beyond the
Protocol: The Future of Due Process in Workplace Dispute Resolution, " 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP.

POL'Y J. 255, 255 (2007).
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Our goal in this Article is modest. We have not attempted
empirically to compare outcomes in cases arising under the AnheuserBusch DRP to litigated cases generally 2 or to outcomes arising under
other dispute resolution programs in an effort to ascertain whether the
DRP results in substantive justice. Nor have we surveyed AnheuserBusch employees (or former employees) who have participated in
dispute resolution under the DRP to ascertain their subjective
perceptions of procedural and substantive fairness. Instead, our goal is
to describe the Anheuser-Busch DRP, evaluate it for procedural fairness
to employees, and to answer the question of whether it is possible for an
employer to achieve the legitimate goals of a dispute resolution program
(such as enhanced employee relations and decreased fees paid to
attorneys for litigation) by implementing a dispute resolution program
containing reasonably fair dispute resolution procedures.
III. AN OVERVIEW

OF ANHEUSER-BUSCH

The creation of Anheuser-Busch can be traced to the Bavarian
Brewery which was founded in 1852 in St. Louis, and was subsequently
purchased by Eberhard Anheuser in 1860, establishing E. Anheuser &
Co. 22 Four years later, Anheuser's son-in-law, Adolphus Busch, became
a part of the business that would eventually be called Anheuser-Busch.2 3
The company's flagship brand, Budweiser, was pioneered in 1876.24
Today, Budweiser and its counterpart, Bud Light, are "the two bestselling beers in the world. ''25 Moreover, the company maintains a nearly
50 percent market share of the U.S. beer market.26

21. For a thorough discussion of why efforts to do so amount to comparing apples with
oranges, see Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's
Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 347-49 (2006).
22. Anheuser-Busch Companies: History, http://www.anheuser-busch.com/History.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2008). Adolphus Busch came to St. Louis as an immigrant from Germany in 1857.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. ANHEUSER-BUSCH Cos., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://anheuserbusch.com/pdf/2006ARAnheuserBusch.pdf. The company
currently retains a 48.4 percent share of the U.S. beer market. Id. at 2, 9. This market share is more
than twice as much as that of its nearest competitor on the domestic front. Id. at 9. Moreover, the
company "leads sales in all major U.S. beer categories: premium, premium light, specialty, popular,
value and nonalcohol." ANHEUSER-BUSCH Cos., THIS Is ANHEUSER-BUSCH 3 (2007) [hereinafter
THIS Is ANHEUSER-BUSCH], available at http://www.anheuserbusch.com/PDF/ABQuickGuide2.pdf.
Since 1957, the company has been the forerunner in the U.S. beer industry. Id. at 24.
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The Anheuser-Busch Companies continue to be headquartered in
St. Louis 27 and are currently comprised of three primary business units:
Beer and Beer-Related, Packaging, and Entertainment. 28 Beer and beerrelated operations is "[t]he company's principal subsidiary[,].
[p]roduc[ing] more than 90 beers, flavored alcoholic beverage and
nonalcoholic brews at 12 breweries in the United States and 15 around
the world ....
In addition to Budweiser and Bud Light, the company
produces such well-known brands as Michelob, Busch, Rolling Rock,
and Bacardi Silver. 30 In total, the company produces beverages across
eleven major groups: Budweiser Family, Michelob Family, Imports,
Specialty Beers, Busch Family, Natural Family, Malt Liquors, Seasonal
Beers, Specialty Malt Beverages, Specialty Organic Beers, and Alliance
Partner Products. 3'
In addition to its beer unit, the company also operates significant
packaging operations, supporting the packaging needs related to beer
production.32 By providing its own packaging materials such as cans,
bottles, and labels, "the company [is able] to manage the supply, cost,
and quality of its packaging. 3 3 Finally, the company is a leading
operator of amusement parks in the United States, U.S. theme park
operators running nine family entertainment parks, including Sea World
and Busch Gardens.34 Annually, the Busch theme parks receive well
over 22 million visitors. 3' The net result of its business operations has
placed Anheuser-Busch at the top of Fortune's industry rankings in the

27. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 68.
28. THIS IS ANHEUSER-BUSCH, supra note 26, at 24-25.
29. Id. at 24.
The beer-related operations include agricultural operations, barley
elevators/contracting offices, hop farms, hop contracting offices, nutri-turf operations, malt plants,
rice mills, seed facilities, research centers, barley offices, refrigerated car companies, and railway
companies. Id. at 25.
30. Anheuser-Busch Companies: Beer, http://www.anheuser-busch.com/BeerVerified.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Beer].
31. Id. For a complete list of the brands produced by Anheuser-Busch, see id.
32. THIS IS ANHEUSER-BUSCH, supra note 26, at 10, 25. The packaging division includes a
metal container corporation, can plants, lid plants, a recycling corporation, a recycling facility, a
printing and packing corporation, a label plant, liner plants, a glass corporation, and a bottle plant.
Id. at 25.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id. at 25. The company's theme parks include two locations of Busch Gardens, three
locations of Sea World, Sesame Place, Aquatica, and Discovery Cove. Id. "Sea World, Busch
Gardens, and Discovery Cove care for the largest zoological collection in the world." 2006
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 22. In addition, within the entertainment business unit, the
company "[o]perates resort, residential, and commercial properties," as well as real estate
developments. THIS ISANHEUSER-BUSCH, supranote 26, at 25.
35. THIS IS ANHEUSER-BUSCH, supra note 26, at 13.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss1/12

8

Bales and Plowman: Compulsory Arbitration as Part of a Broader Employment Dispute Re

2008]

COMPULSORY ARBITRA TION

Beverages category of both America's Most Admired Companies, as

36
well as the magazine's list of the World's Most Admired Companies.
Throughout its U.S.-based operations, Anheuser-Busch employs
roughly 45,000 employees.37 The company has an estimated 8,600

salaried employees, 9,400 union employees, 6,400 non-union hourly
employees, and 20,000 temporary/seasonal workers.3 8 Among its three
business units, the workforce of Anheuser-Busch is both nationwide and
global in terms of distribution of employees.39
IV. THE ANHEUSER-BUSCH ADR PROGRAM
The Anheuser-Busch Companies (the "company") currently run

one of the most extensive and well-developed programs for the nonjudicial resolution of employment disputes. 40

The Dispute Resolution

Program (the "program" or "DRP") combines binding arbitration with a
comprehensive dispute resolution process, focusing on early resolution,
fairness, and open communication. 41 During its ten years of existence,
the program has been very successful at both early resolutions of
problems as well as reducing the company's outside legal fees. 42 In

doing so, Anheuser-Busch's program demonstrates that compulsory

36. America's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, reprinted in FORTUNE Excerpt:
America's Most Admired Companies (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.anheuser-busch.com/PDF/4-1608ab.com.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); World's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, reprinted
in FORTUNE Excerpt: World's Most Admired Companies (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.anheuserbusch.com/PDF/4-16-08ab.com.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). The industry rankings were derived
by averaging each company's score on nine important attributes: innovation, people management,
use of corporate assets, social responsibility, quality of management, financial soundness, long-term
investment, quality of products/services, and globalness. Id. The company was ranked first in eight
out of these nine categories. Id.
37. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross, Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Anheuser-Busch
Cos., & Susan Brueggemann, Dir., Human Res. Serv. Ctr. & Dispute Resolution Program,
Anheuser-Busch Cos.(Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross &
Susan Brueggemann].
38. Id. The majority of those employees classified as seasonal/temporary work at one of the
company's nine parks. Id. As of December 31, 2006, Anheuser-Busch employed a total of 30,183
individuals on a full-time basis. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 34.
39. See THIS iS ANHEUSER-BUSCH, supra note 26, at 25.
40. See ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS., DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM GUIDE 1 (1997)
[hereinafter ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE] (on file with authors).
41. Id.
42. Interview with Richard R. Ross, Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Anheuser-Busch Cos., in St.
Louis, Mo. (Aug. 14, 2007); Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at
51. The program was rolled out in phases, beginning with the entertainment subsidiary in August
1997 and finishing with the corporate headquarters in August 1999. Interview with Richard R.
Ross, supra note 42.
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arbitration and employee fairness do not have to be mutually exclusive.
A. Development and Implementation
Several factors combined to lead the company to begin
investigating the possibility of creating a workplace ADR program.
First, the company sought to open the lines of communication between
employees and management in order to resolve workplace disputes.43
This goal emerged from a lawsuit in which the company identified the
lack of any effective mechanism for employees to approach management
with concerns. 4 Lacking such a process, the company was left in a
situation of potentially first learning of a conflict when a lawsuit was
filed or the conflict was otherwise unnecessarily protracted.45
Second, the company also sought to reduce its legal expenses. 46
Because of its size alone, the company was forced to devote an
enormous amount of time and money to litigation.4 7 This investment
was required to be in place whether or not a lawsuit actually resulted or
not. 48 That is, the anticipation of litigation alone prompted significant
spending on the part of the company. 49 A program that would allow for
fair adjudication of employee conflicts, while also allowing for a
reduction of the legal budget, therefore, would be extremely beneficial to
the company.
Third, and perhaps a consideration growing out of the first two
goals, the company sought quick and fair resolution of employee
disputes-i.e., a dispute resolution process that would allow conflicts to
be resolved in a manner more efficiently and quickly than litigation.5 °
These concerns ultimately prompted the company to begin researching
the possibility of a workplace ADR program.51

43.

Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard

R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
44. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
45. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; see Interview by Peter Phillips with

Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
46. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; see Interview by Peter Phillips with
Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 51.
47. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42.

48.
49.

Id.

Id.

50. Id.; see also Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49
(discussing some of the company's considerations which led to the development of its Dispute

Resolution Program).
51.

Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
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In late 1996, Senior Associate General Counsel Richard R. Ross
began investigating the possibility of implementing an ADR program by

first

benchmarking

programs.

52

other

companies

currently

operating

such

His research resulted in proposals to the company's

management committee, as well as the Board of Directors, by the end of
1996. 53 Ross then spent the better half of 1997 reviewing the case law to
confirm the viability of such a program.54 As the case law developed,
"could be a [great]
Ross realized that a correctly designed ADR program
55

opportunity for both employees and employers.

In developing the program, Ross partnered with Human Resources
from the outset.56 Focus groups were also assembled with employees, as
well as meetings with a number of company executives, managers, and
supervisors.5 7 Throughout the development process, the goal was to

gain a sense of what would work within the company's corporate
culture, and where potential sources of resistance existed. 58 Ultimately,
the design of the program sought to accommodate the needs of each
business unit with respect to addressing employee problems.5 9 In doing
so, the company did not retain any outside resources, but did consult at

R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
52. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 50. Based on this research, Ross concluded that most of these
companies were generally pleased with the results, and were not meeting significant opposition
from employees or seeing a rise in frivolous complaints. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra
note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 50.
53. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49. The backing of senior management and the Board would be of
significance as the program was rolled out. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42;
Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 49.
54. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 50.
55. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 50. In large part, the Supreme Court's opinion in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), was the defining moment for Ross. Interview
by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 50. In Gilmer, the Court held for the
first time that pre-dispute arbitration agreements between employers and employees in the nonunion setting were enforceable, despite the statutory discrimination rights at issue. Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 35. For a more detailed examination of the progression of case law handling employment
arbitration programs, see Bales, supra note 21, at 335-40.
56. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supranote 14, app. at 50.
57. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supranote 14, app. at 50.
58. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supranote 14, app. at 50.
59. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supranote 14, app. at 50-5 1.
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times with ADR organizations and outside counsel. 60 The development
and implementation of the program
chiefly from within the company
61

resulted in minimal start-up costs.

B. An Overview of the DRP
Anheuser-Busch finalized its program in 1997 and implemented the
program through a phased roll-out beginning with its entertainment
subsidiary in August 1997.62 The program applies to all salaried and
non-union hourly employees of the Anheuser-Busch companies, and any
of its U.S. subsidiaries.63 The company invested significant time in
rolling out the program, visiting almost all business sites, meeting with
employees, reviewing the program, answering questions, and meeting
with managers. 64 Significant efforts were concentrated on managers

60. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 51. The company's outside litigation counsel was asked to review
the program for observations and suggestions. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42;
Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 51. CPR and AAA were
also useful resources, supplying "written materials and also putting [the company] in touch with
[other] companies that had already implemented employment ADR programs." Interview with
Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard R. Ross, supra note 14,
app. at 5 1. The company looked at Brown & Root, which, at the time, was operating a program that
was "ahead of the curve." Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra
note 37. Among the unique characteristics of the Brown & Root program was the provision of
attorney fees. For a detailed examination of the Brown & Root program, see BALES, COMPULSORY
ARBITATION, supra note 1, at 102-44. The company also looked at TRW and J.C. Penney.
Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. The TRW
program included mandatory arbitrations but voluntary consequences. Id. Ultimately, the company
hoped to pick the best elements from the currently existing programs and mesh those characteristics
into its program. Id. The company also relied on EEAC, an organization of major corporations,
which ultimately formed a subgroup that served as a resource. Id.
61. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42; Interview by Peter Phillips with Richard
R. Ross, supra note 14, app. at 51.
62. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42.
63. Id. Coverage of the program includes roughly 8,600 salaried employees in the United
States, 6,400 active non-union hourly employees, and 20,000 temporary employees (mostly
employed at theme parks). Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
The program does not cover approximately 9,400 union employees. Id. The program covers only
U.S. employees. Id. Ross believes the program will not expand to include foreign employees,
based primarily on the legal differences abroad. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42.
The several Asian and European counties in which the company operates tend to have
administrative bodies that handle employment disputes. Id. In addition, damages are typically set
by law and limited and the process moves much quicker. Id. The result of these differences is a
lack of need for such a program abroad. Id. A covered employee who is terminated is also subject
to resolving any disputes through DRP. ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS., DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM
POLICY 23 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter CURRENT DRP POLICY] (on file with authors).
64. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42. Ross estimated that both the legal
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65
because of their critical role in implementing the new program.
The initial roll-out of the program also included three
publications-a program guide, a policy statement, and a highlights
brochure. 66 Within these materials, both a flow chart of the DRP was
included, as well as a section containing "Questions and Answers for
Employees. ''67 Throughout these materials, a clear and consistent
message was delivered. A letter from Vice President-Corporate Human
Resources, William L. Rammes, explained to employees:

The company supports a workplace atmosphere that encourages
employees to speak up about problems and seek solutions to them....
DRP is intended to enable employees to more freely and effectively
express their concerns and seek resolution of workplace problems....
[W]e believe that the DRP process can enhance problem resolution in a
simple, fair, timely and economical way, which is in all of our best
interests 68
The materials also highlighted the benefits of the program,
including simplicity, quick resolution, economy, and the availability of
full remedies. 69 The significant time and energy dedicated to the
program roll-out focused on creating buy-in from employees and
managers alike, while also building the program's credibility.7 °
department and the program administrators conducted face-to-face, open meetings with ninety
percent of employees. Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. This
took the form of both a presentation as well answering any employee questions. Id.
65. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supranote 42. Because the great majority of disputes are
to be resolved in Level One, managers were put in a new role of problem solver. Id. This specific
task to having to address employee problems created a new experience for many managers, a
process the company viewed as an ongoing process, centered primarily on common sense. 1d.
66.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH Cos., DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM (DRP) POLICY STATEMENT

(1997) [hereinafter ORIGINAL DRP POLICY] (on file with authors); ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS.,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS (1997)

[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS] (on file with

authors); ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE, supra note 40.
67. ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE, supra note 40, at 8-12; see also CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra
note 63, at 19-23 (containing a more current version of the flow chart and the "Questions and
Answers for Employees" section). For a complete list of the questions answered, see infra note 153
and accompanying text.
68. ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE, supra note 40, at 1.
69.

HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66; ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE, supra note 40, at 2.

70. Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42. Ross noted that he believed marketing
was one of the most important elements of a successful employment ADR program. Id. In fact, he
viewed the biggest deficiency of many other programs as being designed by outside counsel with a
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Following the program's initial implementation, new employees now

receive DRP training as part of new hire orientation, including a
presentation and question and answer session, similar to the initial rollout meetings.71 In addition, management teams are provided periodic
"refresher" trainings. 2

The materials also delivered the consistent message that covered
employees must use the program to resolve workplace disputes and that
by remaining employed with the company, "employees agree, as a
condition of employment, that all covered claims are subject to the
[program]., 73
Finally, the materials reinforced that the at-will
employment relationship continued to exist.74 The company reserves the
right to alter or terminate the program at any time by giving thirty days'
notice, at which point both the company and employees remain
obligated to "complete the processing of any dispute pending in DRP at
the time of the announced change. 75
The current program covers all types of employment disputes.76 In
fact, employees may submit any employment dispute to the program for

view toward legal enforceability, rather than focusing on credibility. Id.
71. Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Bmeggemann, supranote 37.
72. Id.
73. E.g., HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66 ("After the effective date, covered employees must use
the Dispute Resolution Program to resolve workplace disputes. By accepting an offer of
employment or by continuing employment with any Anheuser-Busch company on or after the
effective date of the DRP, new or current employees agree, as a condition of employment, that all
covered claims are subject to the DRP."); see also CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 1
("THIS POLICY CONSTITUTES A BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND THE
COMPANY FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES. By continuing your
employment with Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. or any of its subsidiary companies
("Company"), you and the Company are agreeing as a condition of your employment to submit all
covered claims to the Anheuser-Busch Dispute Resolution Program ("DRP"), to waive all rights to a
trial before a jury on such claims, and to accept an arbitrator's decision as to the final, binding and
exclusive determination of all covered claims.").
74. ORIGINAL DRP POLICY, supra note 66, at 1 ("[T]his procedure does not change the
employment at-will relationship between the company and its employees."); see also CURRENT
DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at I ("This program does not change the employment-at-will
relationship between you and the Company."). Some have argued that an employer amending the
at-will relationship in any way risks converting the relationship to a just-cause relationship. See,
e.g., Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The Interaction Between the Employment-At- Will
Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory FairEmployment Practices
Claims: Difficult Choicesfor At- Will Employers, 73 N.C.L. REv. 443, 481 (1995).
75. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 3. To date, the program has had almost no
modification. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
The only modifications occurred in December, 2003 which further addressed administrative issues
(timing issues and additional explanations) but provided no substantive changes regarding rights or
remedies. Id.
76. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 5.
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Level One resolution.77 The program allows covered claims to proceed
to Level Two and Level Three.
Such disputes are: those that "the
[c]ompany may have against an employee," or those that "the
[e]mployee may have against the [c]ompany and/or an individual
employee.

. .

acting within the scope of

.

.

. employment with the

[c]ompany, where the [e]mployee alleges unlawful termination and/or
unlawful or illegal conduct on the part of the [c]ompany. '79 The current
DRP policy specifically enumerates a number of examples of covered
claims, including claims associated with involuntary terminations,
discrimination, retaliation, workplace accommodation, breach of a duty
of loyalty or fiduciary duty, breach of employment contracts or
covenants, promissory estoppel, tort claims, and violation of public
policy.80 The policy also lists those claims excluded from the program's
coverage, including ERISA, workers' compensation, intellectual
property, NLRA, claims outside the scope of an individual's
employment, and "[c]laims that seek to establish, modify or object to the
Company's policies or procedures, except claims ...

of discriminatory

application." 81
The program's policies contain a number of technical elements that
bring it into compliance with relevant legal restrictions.8 2 For example,
the program makes clear that employees are still free to contact the
EEOC and other govemment agencies.8 3 The program also provides
language relevant to coverage under the Federal Arbitration Act. 4

77. Id. at 5; see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text regarding the level classification of
the DRP.
78. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supranote 63, at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The majority of claims excluded are handled by pre-existing internal procedures that
prevent such claims from entering the program. Telephone Interview Richard R. Ross & Susan
Brueggemann, supra note 37. Many programs existing prior to the Anheuser-Busch program
excluded intellectual property claims. Id. DRP also excludes intellectual property claims, based
primarily on the need for injunctive relief, such as a temporary restraining order. Id.
82. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
83. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 3 ("Nothing in this program is intended to
discourage or interfere with the legally protected rights of Employees to file administrative claims
or charges with government agencies. Such agencies include, but are not limited to, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP), and related state fair-employment agencies."). The program does provide that,
"if an Employee files a charge with the EEOC, OFCCP, or with a state fair-employment agency, the
Company may request the agency to defer its processing of the charge until the Employee and the
Company complete the DRP." Id.
84. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006); CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 6 ("This program
constitutes a written agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A.
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Language is also included that reinforces the applicability of the
program in the face of judicial challenges.8 5 Finally, from a logistical
standpoint, the program established the position of DRP Administrator
within the company.86
The Anheuser-Busch DRP builds off previous successful programs
by going beyond the standard arbitration agreement used by many other
employers instituting compulsory arbitration programs. 87 The goal of
the program is a timely and effective resolution to workplace disputes.88
The company acknowledges that workplace disputes occur, but an
Sections 1-14. The parties acknowledge that the Company is engaged in transactions involving
interstate commerce and Employees eligible to participate in the DRP are not employed by the
Company as seamen, railroad employees, or other class of worker engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.").
85. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 6 ("If a court of competent jurisdiction
determines that the DRP is not the exclusive, final and binding method for the Company and its
Employees to resolve disputes, and/or that the decision and award of the arbitrator is not final and
binding as to some or all of the claim(s) in dispute, the Company and the Employee agree that they
will first use the DRP for any covered claims before filing or pursuing any legal, equitable,
administrative or other formal proceeding. If a court determines that any provision of the DRP is
invalid or unenforceable, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions shall
not be affected by the determination and each remaining provision of the DRP shall be valid, legal
and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law.").
86. Id. at 3. The Administrator position is responsible for:
1. Coordinat[ing] the receipt of [e]mployee disputes with managers and HR
representatives;
2. Answer[ing] questions about the [program];
3. Monitor[ing] compliance with and requests for extensions of all time limits for
submission of claims;
4. Coordinat[ing] the scheduling of mediation and arbitration...,
5. Schedul[ing] training sessions for [e]mployees and managers;
6. Schedul[ing] the [c]ompany's participation in pre-arbitration communications with
arbitrators and [e]mployees regarding . . . discovery [requests];
7. Work[ing] with [c]ompany representatives, [e]mployees, and their attorneys, to
select and schedule mediators and arbitrators;
8. Administer[ing] and interpret[ing] the terms and conditions of the [program] ...
9. [Serving] as the [c]ompany administrative liaison with the [organization of
professional mediators or arbitrators (such as AAA)]; and
10. Attend[ing] mediations and arbitration hearings.
Id. at 3-4. Currently, the Administrator position is supported by a Coordinator position. Telephone
Interview Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. The travel time involved with the
Administrator position depends on the volume of claims. Id. The position currently does not travel
to mediations and arbitrations in which inside or outside counsel is representing the company, but
does attend all proceedings with pro se parties. Id. The company has maintained the Administrator
position as a neutral, with an interest in resolution. Id. In doing so, a vice president or other
manager will serve as the company's representative in the DRP process. Id. The Administrator's
decision making power starts and stops in deciding whether a claim is eligible for participation in
the DRP. Id.
87. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
88. See supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
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overriding interest of all involved parties is "resolving these disputes
expeditiously and fairly."89 In the most succinct description, the
brochure highlighting the program explains that, "[t]he purpose of the
DRP is to enable employees to more freely and effectively express their
concerns and seek resolution of workplace problems through a process
that emphasizes fairness and due process while minimizing
bureaucracy." 90
To this end, Anheuser-Busch has developed a three-step process for
the resolution of employment disputes after informal efforts do not
resolve an employee's dispute. 91 Level One, Local Management
Review, is an attempt to settle the dispute involving the employee and
management team, the procedures of which are designed to suit the
needs of each business unit.92 If the employee is not pleased with the
results, the employee may pursue a covered claim at Level Two with
mediation.93 If, at Level Two, a resolution is not achieved, the employee
may then seek binding arbitration at Level Three.94 Employees are
required to "complete each level of the process before proceeding to the
next level." 95 Throughout the program, retaliation is prohibited "against
anyone who submits a dispute to the [program], or who participates as
witness or otherwise in the DRP process. 9 6
C. The Three-Step Process

1. Local Management Review (Level One)
Level One of the DRP involves "Local Management Review," the

89. ORIGINAL DRP GUIDE, supra note 40, at 1.
90.

HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66.

91. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 2. The program provides: "Employees are
encouraged to resolve work-related disputes informally through dialogue with their managers, a
Human Resources (HR) representative, or the Anheuser-Busch Personnel Communications
department. However, when informal efforts do not resolve an Employee's dispute, and the
Employee wishes to pursue the matter further, an Employee must submit his or her dispute to the
DRP." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 80 for a discussion of covered claims.
94. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6.
Both Ross and the Dispute Resolution Program Administrator, Susan
Brueggemann, explained that retaliation has been a non-issue in the program. Telephone Interview
Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. Ross explained that the company closely
guards the integrity of the program and has stopped any effort to retaliate at the earliest stages. Id.
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procedures for which change based upon what is required for the
"individual subsidiary or business unit., 97 The common element of a
Level One dispute, however, is the submission of a DRP Notice of
Dispute form98 to the local Human Resources representative. 9" The form
is one page and includes basic personal information and a description of
the dispute. 00 There are no time limits for an employee to submit
disputes to Level One.' 0' However, if an employee intends to submit a
submit the
covered claim to Levels Two or Three, the employee must
102
limitation.
time
applicable
the
within
One
dispute to Level
2. Non-Binding Mediation (Level Two)
Level Two, involving nonbinding mediation, is available for any
covered claim previously submitted to Level One within the applicable
time limits.10 3 Under the program, the mediation is confidential and
private, and the mediator has the ability to meet with the parties
97. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 7. In an effort to tailor the Level One
procedures in the most effective way, each business unit has created unique procedures. Id. For
example, the packaging group currently utilizes a peer review process, which serves the functions of
the Level One. Telephone Interview Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. From
an administrative standpoint, each business group has a different tri-fold brochure highlighting the
DRP. Id. The company, however, is moving away from separate materials for each group. Id.
98.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH Cos., ANHEUSER-BUSCH DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM LEVEL

ONE: LOCAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter Level One] (on file with authors). A full
set of forms was developed from the outset of the program in order to ensure the formality and
consistency of the DRP. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra
note 37.
99. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 1.1 at 7. The local HR manager is responsible
for forwarding a copy of the form to the DRP Administrator. Id.
100. Level One, supra note 98. The form also confirms the employee's participation in the
program with the following language: "I submit the above dispute to the Anheuser-Busch Dispute
Resolution Program ("DRP") for resolution. I acknowledge and agree that if any covered claim is
not resolved at Levels I or 2 and if I wish to pursue the matter further, I must request arbitration for
resolution of such claim, and that the arbitration decision will be final and binding on both me and
the Company." Id.
101. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 2.1 at 7.
102. Id. See supra Part IV.B as to which claims are "covered claims."
103. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, at 8. In order to submit a covered claim to Level
Two, "the dispute must have been submitted to Level One within 180 days of the date the dispute
arose or before the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the alleged unlawful conduct
or violation of law, whichever is longer." Id. at 6. The company describes mediation as
a process that seeks to find common ground for the voluntary settlement of covered
claims. Mediation involves an attempt by the parties to resolve their disputes with the
aid of a neutral third party not employed by the Company. The mediator's role is
advisory. The mediator may offer suggestions and question the parties, but resolution of
the dispute rests with the parties themselves.
Id. art. 1.1 at 8.
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mutually or separately in order to facilitate resolution. 10 4 Similar to
Level One, the Level Two process is initiated by the employee via a
form. 0 5 The employee is required to pay a $50 fee when submitting the
claim to Level Two and must do so within thirty calendar days from the
finalized Level One resolution. 10 6 The program Administrator then
determines whether the claim can qualify for the DRP procedure.'0 7 If
so, the company then pays any administrative fees related to the
mediation, the mediator's fees, the expenses associated with renting
meeting space, and the "[e]mployee's salary or wages ...

for the time

spent at the mediation."' 8
In a detailed fashion, the program outlines the logistics of the
mediation. First, the mediator is jointly selected by the employee and
the company. 10 9 If there is no agreement regarding the selection of a
mediator, the program Administrator requests that an organization of
professional mediators and arbitrators (such as the American Arbitration
Association) appoint a mediator in compliance with its procedures.' 0
Second, the program requires that typically the mediator should have a
minimum of five years' experience in either the practice of employment
law or the mediation of employment claims."' Third, the parties agree
104. Id. arts. 1.1-1.2 at 8. The entire mediation is confidential except for the fact that the
process has taken place. Id. art. 9.1 at 10. The program stipulates that the parties and mediator shall
not disclose any information regarding the mediation process, the settlement, or the outcome unless
required by law or agreed among the parties. Id. The settlement terms may be disclosed in an
action to enforce compliance with the terms of the settlement. Id. Furthermore, no formal record or
transcript takes place at the mediation. Id.
105. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Anheuser-Busch Dispute Resolution Program Level Two: Request
for NonBinding Mediation, (2007) [hereinafter Level Two] (on file with authors). The two-page
form requests personal information, the nature of the claim, details of the claim, remedies sought,
and legal representation (if applicable). Id. The form also contains the following language:
I submit this covered claim(s) for Non-Binding Mediation under the Anheuser-Busch
Dispute Resolution Program ("DRP"). I understand that the mediation proceedings will
be confidential and that the mediator does not have authority to bind the parties. I
further understand that if the dispute is not resolved during mediation and if I wish to
pursue this matter further, I must submit this dispute to arbitration under the DRP for a
determination of the matter that will be final and binding on both me and the Company.
Id.
106. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supranote 63, arts. 2.1-2.2 at 8.
107. Id. art. 2.4; see supra text accompanying note 80 for a discussion of which claims are
covered under the program. The decision of the Administrator as to the eligibility of the claim is
"final and binding on [both] the [c]ompany and the [e]mployee." CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra
note 63, art. 2.5 at 8.
108. Id. art. 10.1 at 10.
109. Id. art. 3.1 at 9. It is provided that mediator candidates will reveal any possible conflicts
of interest. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. art. 4.1 at 9. In addition to the requisite experience, the procedures prohibit any
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on a date, time and location for the mediation;' 12 however, if the parties
do not agree, the mediator schedules
the mediation on a normal business
11 3
day during normal business hours.
Prior to the mediation, each party has the option of providing to the
mediator a written summary of the dispute, which sets forth the party's
position concerning the claims.' 14 Once commenced, the mediation
typically takes a full day but may be extended if necessary. 115 During
the mediation, either party or the mediator may end the mediation at any
point. 116 In addition, either party may choose to be assisted or
represented by an attorney, 1 7 however, the program stipulates that if the
employee elects not to have an attorney present at the mediation, then
the company cannot have an attorney present either.11 8 Because of the
private and confidential nature of the mediation, the only people present
at the mediation are the mediator, the employee, his or her spouse and
attorney, company representatives, and the company attorney. 1 9
3. Binding Arbitration (Level Three)
If an employee and the company do not reach a resolution at Level
Two, an employee wishing to pursue the covered claim(s) further must
submit the covered claim to Level Three, binding arbitration.12 As
opposed to mediation, under the arbitral method the arbitrator decides
the merits of the claims and issues a written decision, which is final and
binding on both parties. 12 ' The arbitration process begins when the

mediator from having any direct financial or personal interest in the outcome of the mediation. Id.
112. Id. art. 5.1 at 9. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the mediation takes place within
twenty-five miles of the work location where the dispute arose. Id. If the mediation takes place
outside that mileage radius, the DRP Administrator has discretion to pay the employee's reasonable
travel expenses. Id.
113. Id. art. 5.1 at9.
114. Id. art. 7.1 at 9.
115. Id. art. 6.1 at 9.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 8.1 at 9. DRP Administrator, Susan Brueggemann, estimates that in about half of
all Level Two disputes employees choose to bring an attorney to mediations. Telephone Interview
with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supranote 37.
118. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 8.1 at 9. The employee must notify the
company within fourteen days of the mediation whether an attorney will be present. Id.
119. Id. art. 8.2 at 9. The program does provide, however, that the parties may agree to have

other parties in attendance. Id.
120, Id. art. I at 11. The program provides: "Binding arbitration is a dispute-resolution process
in which the Employee and the Company present their respective positions concerning their covered
claim(s) to an impartial third-party arbitrator who determines the legal merits of the claim(s)." Id.
121, Id. art. 1.2 at 11. The arbitration hearing is similar to a court proceeding in that both
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employee submits the Request for Binding Arbitration form 12 2 and a

$125 fee. 123 The Company then pays for any filing and other
administrative fees, the arbitrator's fees, meeting space, employee's
salary or wages up to a maximum of seven hearing days for the time
spent at the arbitration hearing, and the salary or wages of employees
called as witnesses up to a maximum of two hearing days per
employee. 124 Each party125is responsible for other normal costs, such as

expert and attorney fees.
As would be expected, the program provides many more details
regarding the arbitration hearing, each of which will be discussed in
turn. The selection of the neutral arbitrator begins when the program
Administrator requests an association, such as AAA, to provide a list of
qualified candidates. 126 The company and the employee then attempt to

agree on the selection of the arbitrator, with each party retaining the
right to request a list of additional candidates. 127 Procedures are also
provided if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator. 128
The parties are free to agree on a date and time for the arbitration
hearing, which normally takes place within twenty-five miles of the
work location where the dispute arose. 129 Similar to the Level Two

parties may be represented by an attorney, make opening statements, present testimony of witnesses
and introduce exhibits, cross-examine the other party's witnesses, and make closing statements. Id.
122. Id. art. 2.1 at 11. The two-page form requests personal information, nature of the claim,
details of the claim, requested remedies, and legal representation (if applicable). ANHEUSER-BUSCH
Cos., ANHEUSER-BUSCH DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM LEVEL THREE: REQUEST FOR BINDING

ARBITRATION, (2007) [hereinafter LEVEL THREE] (on file with authors). The form contains the
following language: "I submit the covered claim(s) for Binding Arbitration under the AnheuserBusch Dispute Resolution Program ("DRP"). I understand and agree that this matter will be
decided by an arbitrator, not by a court or by a jury, and that the decision of the arbitrator will be
final and binding on both the Company and me." Id.
123. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 2.1 at 11.
124. Id. art. 18.1 at 18.
125. Id. art. 18.2 at 18. These costs may be awarded to the employee by the arbitrator as
provided under applicable law. Id.
126. Id. art. 3.2 at 11. All arbitrator candidates must also disclose potential conflicts of
interest. Id. art. 3.5 at 12. In addition, the arbitrator must be a licensed attorney, with at least five
years experience in practicing employment law or arbitrating employment law claims, and cannot
have any direct financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration. Id. art. 4.1 at 12.
127. Id. art. 3.4 at 12. Each party is also able to interview arbitrator candidates, provided that
the other party is notified and given the opportunity to participate. Id. art. 3.6 at 12.
128. Id. art. 3.7 at 12. The program Administrator will request that the association, such as
AAA, appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the organization's procedures. Id.
129. Id. art. 5.2 at 12. If the parties agree on a location beyond the twenty-five mile radius,
then the Administrator may pay reasonable employee travel expenses. Id. However, if the parties
fail to come to an agreement on the date and time of the hearing, then the arbitrator will so decide.
Id. art. 5.1 at 12.
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mediation, the employee may be assisted or represented by counsel at
Level Three. 130 In addition, if the employee is represented by an
attorney at the arbitration, then the company must also be represented.' 13
Either party may call witnesses, including experts, the total of which
may not exceed ten.132 The arbitration is a private hearing that may be
attended only by the arbitrator, an official recorder, the employee and his
or her spouse, company representatives, attorneys, experts, and
witnesses. 133
Under the program, discovery is conducted "in the most expeditious
and cost-effective manner practicable and shall be limited to that which
is relevant and material to the covered claim(s) and for which each party
has a substantial, demonstrable need."'' 34
In carrying out this
philosophy, all discovery must be completed no later than ten days
before the start of the arbitration hearing. 35
Depositions,
interrogatories, and production of documents are all available under the
discovery provisions of the program. 136 Should a discovery dispute
arise, the arbitrator is responsible for its resolution no later than ten days

130. Id. art. 6.1 at 13.
131. Id. The company estimates that two-thirds of employees are represented by counsel at
Level Three hearings, with the remaining one-third proceeding without representation. Telephone
Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
132. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 6.2 at 13. The number of witnesses called by
each side may exceed 10 if agreed to by the parties or if granted by the arbitrator after a request
based on good cause. Id. Additionally, during the hearing the arbitrator may sequester the
witnesses. Id. art. 6.4 at 13.
133. Id. art. 6.3 at 13. However, the parties may agree, in writing, to allow other individuals to
attend the arbitration. Id.
134. Id. art. 7.2 at 13.
135. Id. art. 7.3 at 13.
136. Id. art. 7.3(a)-(c) at 13. Each party may depose expert witnesses and two additional
individuals; all depositions are conducted under oath and transcribed by a court reporter. Id. art.
7.3(a) at 13. The party requesting the deposition pays all costs related to the court reporter and the
original transcript, while the other party retains the option of purchasing a copy of the transcript.
Id. Depositions tend to be taken more often in disputes in which the employee is represented by
counsel. Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. Up to ten
interrogatories, including subparts, may be submitted by either party. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra
note 63, art. 7.3(b) at 13. Whether the questions are labeled as such, interrogatories tend to occur
frequently from employees both represented by counsel and those proceeding without
representation. Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. Each party
may request the production of relevant documents at the cost of the requesting party, yet the
producing party retains the right to object to the request. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art.
7.3(c) at 13. In addition, neither party is required to produce documents that are proprietary,
confidential, privileged, confidential, or trade-secret information. Id. Similar to interrogatories, the
production of documents tends to occur at the same rate between both represented and
unrepresented employees. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann,
supra note 37.
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before the start of the hearing. 137 Additionally, at the request of the
parties the arbitrator is empowered to authorize additional discovery
beyond the scope outlined under the DRP,138 and may also issue
subpoenas, pursuant to section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, with
respect to witnesses or documents. 139 Thirty days prior to the arbitration
hearing, each party provides written notice to the other party of the
names and addresses of all witnesses, copies of all documents intended
to be introduced, and the names and addresses of attorneys attending the
hearings. 40 Either party may arrange for stenographic record and
transcript of the arbitration heaing. 41
With respect to evidence, the DRP provides that "[t]he Arbitrator
shall afford each party a full and fair opportunity to present any proof
relevant and material to the covered claim(s), to call and cross-examine
witnesses and to present argument."' 14 All testimony must be under
oath, and the arbitrator determines the weight and relevance afforded to
evidence.143 Within the parameters of these guidelines, however, the
arbitrator is not bound by formal rules governing evidence, except for
the attorney-client and work-product privileges. 44 Rather, the arbitrator
determines the admissibility of the evidence offered by the parties, and
that determination is both final and binding. 45 While the evidence
standards are relaxed during the arbitral hearing, each party still bears
of persuasion on its claims in accordance with applicable
the burden
6
law.

4

At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, each party has the
opportunity to submit a written brief to the arbitrator. 147 The arbitrator,
137.
138.
139.

CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 7.3(d) at 14.
Id. art. 7.3(f).
CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 9.1 at 14 (citing 9 U.S.C.

§§

1-14).

The

arbitrator is also authorized to issue protective orders in response to a request by either party, such
as sealing the record of the hearing in order to protect privacy, trade secrets, proprietary
information, or other legal rights of the parties and witnesses. Id. art. 7.5 at 14.
140.

CURRENT DRP POLICY, supranote 63, art. 7.4 at 14. This list may be supplemented up to

twenty days prior to the hearing. Id.
141. Id. art. 8.1 at 14. If only one party requests arecord of the hearing then that party pays the
entire cost of the record; however, if both parties request that a record be made, then the cost is
shared equally between the parties. Id. art. 8.2 at 14. In either event, if a transcript is in fact
produced, the arbitrator is provided a copy. Id. art. 8.3 at 14.
142. Id. art. 10.1 at 15. The program stipulates that the arbitrator shall not receive evidence by
affidavit or that submitted after the hearing, unless agreed to by the parties. Id.
143. Id. arts. 10.2-10.3 at 15.
144. Id. art. 10.4at 15.
145. Id. art. 10.5 at 15.
146. Id. art. 11.1 at 15.
147. Id. art. 12.1 at 15. If a party so chooses, the brief must be submitted within thirty days of
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in turn, issues a written opinion to the parties. 48 In granting relief, the
arbitrator has the same power and authority as a judge or jury and may
grant any relief available under applicable law. 149 Except as provided by
the Federal Arbitration Act, the arbitrator's award is generally not
150
subject to review or appeal, notwithstanding otherwise applicable law.
Finally, the program stipulates that the arbitrator's award is not to be
published and has no legal effect on employees not party to the
arbitration.15' The confidential nature of the arbitration is reinforced
52
with a complete description of the parameters of such confidentiality.
At the conclusion of the CURRENT DRP POLICY, a list of
"Questions and Answers for Employees" is provided that summarizes
these program guidelines in a concise and understandable fashion. 53 As
mentioned previously, the CURRENT DRP POLICY encompasses a flow
chart that illustrates the various stages of the program, and the company
also produces a tri-fold brochure that outlines the highlights of the
154
DRP.

the close of the arbitration hearing or receipt of the transcript, whichever is later. Id. The parties
waive the right to file a brief if they fail to notify the arbitrator of their intent to do so by the end of
the hearing. Id. The company tends to always submit a written brief as it helps to firm up a
position. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
Generally, employees tend to follow the company lead and also submit written briefs. Id.
148. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63, art. 12.4 at 15. This written opinion is issued
within thirty days of the close of the hearing or within thirty days of receipt of the parties' briefs,
whichever is later. Id. Among other things, the opinion contains a summary of the claims arbitrated
and decided; findings of fact and conclusions of law; and the rationale for any grant of relief. Id.
art. 12.5 at 16.
149. Id. art. 14.2 at 16. Both parties are obligated to mitigate damages and the arbitrator shall
take such mitigation into account in granting relief. Id. "The arbitrator may sanction either party by
awarding the other party its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs ... upon a finding that a claim was
frivolous or brought to harass the employee, the employer, or the employer's personnel." Id. art.
15.1 at 17. The arbitrator may also sanction either party for unreasonable delay, failure to cooperate
in discovery, or failure to comply with requirements of confidentiality. Id. art. 15.2 at 17. The
arbitrator may also issue a supplemental award to a terminated employee that grants reasonable
front pay instead of reinstatement. Id. art. 15.2 at 17.
150. Id. art. 17.3 at 17. The Federal Arbitration Act allows for review or appeal of an
arbitration award only in limited circumstances. See 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
151. CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63 art. 17.4 at 17.
152. Id. art. 19.1 at 18. Generally, all aspects of the arbitration hearing are confidential. Id.
However, confidentiality may be waived to (i) the extent that both parties agree in writing; (ii) as
may be appropriate in any subsequent proceedings between the parties or (iii) as appropriate in
response to a governmental agency request or otherwise provided by law. Id.
153. Id. at 20-23.
154.

HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66.
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V.

RESULTS

A. Outcomes Assessment

A thorough assessment of the DRP's results begins with evaluating
the program against its initial objectives.1 55 With respect to the first
goal, creating an open system of communication with management in
order to facilitate resolution of employee disputes, the DRP has
succeeded in creating such a process. On a macro-level, the DRP creates
a stream-lined process for identifying conflicts to management. Indeed,
any matter may be submitted for Level One resolution.156 Moreover,
and on the micro-level, Level One disputes are subject to local
management review. 157 That is, the local manager and the employee
meet face-to-face and attempt to resolve the conflict using non-judicial
throughout the
methods. The Program Administrator is involved
58
process, with an eye toward resolving the conflict.'
The company's second goal, reducing legal expenses, has also been
achieved through the DRP. The company initially benchmarked the
program's success, based on previous litigation costs.

159

The company

quickly saw a roughly fifty percent reduction in legal costs, as well as a
fifty percent reduction in administrative costs.

60

This amount of savings

has continued as the company has maintained consistent spending since
the initial savings were realized.' 6' Furthermore, the company has not
experienced any spike in fees or settlement costs.162 In doing so, the
DRP has satisfied one of the company's major goals.' 63 Indeed, the
the company is primarily allocated to matters
current litigation budget of
164
not covered by the DRP.
The company's third goal, the quick and fair resolution of conflicts
155.
156.
157.

See supra Part IV.A (outlining the initial goals of the program).
See supra Part IV.C. 1 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.C. 1 and accompanying text.

158.

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

159.

Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supranote 37.

160.
161.

Id.
Id.

162. Id.
163. Id.; see supra Part IV.A
164. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. These
matters include union employees, applicants, non-employees, and the like. Id.; see supra note 81

and accompanying text (listing of non-covered claims). In addition, a small portion of the budget is
allocated to motions to compel. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann,
supra note 37.
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at the lowest possible level, may perhaps be the most striking evidence
of the DRP's success. 165 Of the claims submitted to DRP, 95% are
resolved at Level One (Local Management Review). 166 Of the
remaining five percent, four percent are resolved at mediation (Level
Two), with only one percent proceeding to Level Three binding
arbitration. 167 The following chart tracks historical data, beginning in
2003 and remaining current through July 2007.

LOCAL

YEAR

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

MANAGEMENT

MEDIATION

MANGEEN

(Level

(Level One)
592-96.1%
569-95.8%
217 -92.3%
113-85%
78 100%

Two)
19-3.1%
21 -3.5%
14 -6%
18-13.5%
0 -0%

ARBITRATION

(Level Three)
5-0.8%
4-0.7%
4 -1.7%
2-1.5%
0 0%

616
594
235
133
1656

Figure 1. Historical data of claims settled, indicating the level at
which disputes were settled under the DRP. Total Claims in Data
Set= 1656.168

165. See supra Part IV.A.
166. DRP METRICS (July 12, 2007) [hereinafter DRP METRICS] (on file with authors).
167. Id. Throughout the DRP process, the company encourages the settlement of disputes,
which can also occur between levels (e.g., settling after an unresolved Level Two mediation,
settling between filing a Level Three binding arbitration and the actual mediation). Telephone
Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
168. DRP METRICS, supra note 166. The company purges historical data more than five years
old. Therefore, the historical data presented is the most comprehensive set available. Some may
consider a comparison of "parallel" union numbers useful (i.e. number of grievances filed vs.
number of arbitrations conducted), however the authors believe this would be comparing two
distinct sets of employees, both operating under unique processes and varying influences, rendering
such a comparison of little value.
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The company credits much of the reduced number of claims
submitted to the program on the informal communication taking place
between employees and management in order to resolve disputes prior to
even submitting the dispute for resolution. 169 Although it is likely not
possible to track such information, data concerning the pre-DRP
resolution of conflict would bolster this hypothesis. While this certainly
may be the case, an alternative explanation would suggest that
employees are simply unconvinced of the program's utility and fail to
submit claims in the first place. Under this theory, however, one would
likely expect to see increased judicial challenges to the program as well,
an event that has failed to happen.170
The resolution of disputes at the lowest possible level obviously
saves the company litigation costs, but the remarkably low number of
arbitrations also saves the company significant time and money. In
addition to successfully resolving disputes at the lowest possible level,
the program has also achieved such results in a much quicker fashion
than that provided by traditional litigation options. Across the same
historical period, Level One disputes are resolved in an average of four
weeks. 71 Level Two disputes are resolved, on average, in six months,
with Level Three disputes being resolved in an average of fifteen

months. 172
There are also a few anecdotal pieces that should be considered
when evaluating the outcomes of the program. First, the confidentiality
provisions of the program, to the extent of management's knowledge,
have been universally accepted.1 73 Ross attributes much of this to the
internal respect for the DRP. 174
Some of the internal culture of
Anheuser-Busch, including a constant focus on high quality, certainly
contributed to this success as well. 175 In fact, this slice of the company's
176
corporate culture has lent itself to the overall integrity of the program.
Both Senior Associate General Counsel Richard Ross and Human
Resources Director Susan Brueggemann explained that they have failed
to see any employee who used the program and vocally felt they had

169. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
170. See infra note 176.
171.

DRP METRICS, supra note 166.

172. Id.
173. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
Employees may be speaking in violation of the confidentiality terms, but no reports have been
brought to the attention of management. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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been taken advantage of, cheated, or the like at the conclusion. 177
Indeed, some have used the program and failed to prevail on their claim,
178
but finished with an appreciation for the process.
Second, the integrity of the program, and perhaps successfully
protecting its integrity, may be the most critical element of the
program's success.
From its initial roll-out, through its current
operation, the integrity of the program is what keeps employees
submitting their disputes to the DRP. 17 9 This voluntary submission of
the dispute for resolution has limited the number of judicial challenges
involving the DRP. Indeed, the company has faced judicial challenges
in less than a dozen cases.180 In all but one of those cases, the
company's motion
to compel was granted, removing the dispute to DRP
18
for resolution. 1
B. Follow-up and Future Challenges
In terms of future follow-up planned for the program, the company
plans to send out a "reminder" of the program to refresh people on the
program's availability and features. 182 Perhaps one of the greatest
challenges the company faces is allocating additional resources,
including time and money, to modify or otherwise tweak the program
1 83
because it currently works so well.
The program currently faces two significant challenges. First, in
particular geographic regions, there is a shortage of qualified neutrals to
serve as mediators and arbitrators.' 84 Unlike regions with an abundance
of quality neutrals such as Florida, the northeast, and Texas, the Midwest
lacks a significant population of qualified neutrals that fit the program's

177.
178.

Id.
Id.

179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id. In the one case involving a denied motion to compel, the company's motion for

summary judgment was subsequently granted. Id. The denied motion to compel was by a federal
judge in Florida in the early days of the DRP. Id. No information regarding the denied motion was
available in published format or from the company. Id.
182.

Id. This is important from a legal perspective to notify and remind employees that the

program is a term and condition of continued employment. Id.
183. Id. There has been no further discussion of providing for attorneys' fees, but the issue
may be reconsidered when other parameters of the program are adjusted. Id.
184. Id. See, e.g., David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR,
8-APR Bus. L. TODAY 24 (1999) (noting that, in 1999, 30% of the largest 1,000 U.S. corporations

identified a lack of qualified and experienced neutrals). Given the rapid growth of ADR since 1999,
it appears the lack of quality neutrals has undoubtedly swelled to a general sentiment.
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criteria. 85 This problem is somewhat relieved, however, by the
employee's participation in the selection of a neutral. 186 The far more
troubling challenge is various emerging state laws and regulations
regarding the unauthorized practice of law with the presence of out-ofstate counsel at mediation and/or arbitration. 87 Furthermore, some
jurisdictions suggest that a licensed attorney is required to be present at
arbitration, a proposition that is directly at 8odds with the employee's
option of self-representation under the DRP.1
These challenges, however, seemingly demonstrate the success of
the program. Because the most significant hurdles to the program
remain external to the company, the internal mechanisms of the program
remain efficient. As the law continues to respond to and shape the ADR
landscape, it is likely that Anheuser-Busch will modify its program to
ensure its continued success at achieving the company's goals-quick
and fair resolution of employee disputes and reduced legal exposure.
VI. ANALYSIS

In addition to evaluating the success of the program relative to

185. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
186. Id. See supra notes 109-110, 126-128 and accompanying text (explaining the employee's
role in the selection of a neutral).
187. Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4(b) (West 2005) (providing restrictions on non-California
attorneys serving as counsel in a California arbitration); RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR R.
1-3.11,
available
at
http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/60A2F6198D8AD63C852570DF0052D642
(limiting
a non-Florida attorney's participations in arbitrations taking place in Florida). See generally Lane
Hornfeck, The Pitfalls of Mediating and Arbitrating on the Mainland: Are You Inadvertently
Committing the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 11 -JUN HAW. B.J. 4 (2007) (discussing that an
attorney may engage in the unauthorized practice of law when involved in ADR without knowledge
because of various rules and regulations across the country); D. Ryan Nayar, UnauthorizedPractice
of Law in PrivateArbitral Proceedings: A JurisdictionalSurvey, 6 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2007) (outlining
the requisite credentials of a neutral arbitrator on a state-by-state basis). If an attorney licensed in
another state is committing the unauthorized practice of law by virtue of serving as a neutral
arbitrator in a proceeding, it clearly follows that another company representative's presence at such
hearings (such as HR or local managers) is also the unauthorized practice of law. Telephone
Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37.
188. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexicole, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 348, 350 (2004) (a non-attomey
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio when representing his client in a securities
arbitration taking place in Ohio). If the employee elects to proceed without counsel, the company
would follow suit and be represented by a Human Resources representative or other manager.
Telephone Interview with Richard R. Ross & Susan Brueggemann, supra note 37. This case,
however, would suggest that such representation would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
Disciplinary Counsel, 822 N.E.2d at 350.
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Anheuser-Busch, 189 the program must also be considered as to its
viability as a model for a fair dispute resolution program. This section
seeks to evaluate the program in such a light, answering the questions of
whether employers can use the program in drafting fair, ethical, and
enforceable arbitration agreements and whether courts could use the
program as a benchmark in deciding the enforceability of other
employment arbitration programs. 19° Our analysis will consider the
DRP in light of The Employment Due Process Protocolfor Mediation
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment
Relationship,19 1 the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures, 192 and applicable case law.
The Due Process Protocol was designed "as a means of providing
due process in the resolution by mediation and binding arbitration of
employment disputes involving statutory rights., 193 The Protocol
specifically recognizes the timing of an agreement to mediate and/or
arbitrate as an issue but takes no position on the issue. 194 The Protocol
specifies that the agreement should be knowingly made, a standard met
by Anheuser-Busch's DRP. 195 The Protocol outlines three broad
standards regarding the right of representation: choice of representative,
fees for representation, and access to information. 196 The DRP meets the
standards outlined in this section, allowing the employee to choose her
representative, leaving the issue of payment of representation to be
determined by the employee and the representative, and providing for
pre-trial discovery. 197 The protocol suggests the provision of partial
employer reimbursement for representation costs, which the DRP does
not provide. 198 After the initial fee paid by the employee, however, the
189.

See supra Part V.

190.
191.

See supra Part I.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2007),

For an in-depth
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 [hereinafter PROTOCOL].
effectiveness as a benchmark, see generally, Richard A. Bales,
examination of the Protocol and its
The Employment Due ProcessProtocolat Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts
of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 178-84 (2005); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits
on the Due ProcessProtocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369 (2004).
192. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES &

MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904 [hereinafter
RULES].
193. PROTOCOL, supra note 191.
194. Id.
195. Id. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text (regarding knowingly made
agreement).
196. PROTOCOL, supra note 191.
197. See supra Part lV.C and accompanying text.
198. PROTOCOL, supra note 191. The Protocol merely recommends the provision of attorney
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company does cover all mediator and arbitrator fees.' 99
The Protocol outlines the qualifications necessary for mediators and
arbitrators, including provisions for roster membership, training, panel
selection, conflicts of interest, authority of the arbitrator, and
compensation of the mediator and arbitrator. 20 0
Again, the DRP
20 1
explicitly covers each of these standards.
Finally, the Protocol
provides that the arbitrator's award is final and binding, with a limited
202
scope of review.
The company's program also provides for such a
20 3
standard.
When evaluated against the Protocol's standards, AnheuserBusch's DRP not only meets the outlined standards, but in many cases,
exceeds them.20 4 In doing so, the program could serve as a model of
what at least one coalition has deemed to be the important safeguards to
employees' due process.
The DRP also complies with the Employment Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures outlined by AAA.2 °5 Indeed, Ross consulted
with both AAA and CPR in designing the DRP in order to ensure its
compliance with applicable rules and procedures.20 6 The continued
compliance with such provisions is ensured by the fact that AAA will
decline to administer employment ADR cases if it determines that a
company's program does not comply with the Protocol or the
Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.20 7
Consistency with the Protocol is often cited by courts to determine
whether an arbitration rule fair and enforceable.20 8 Likewise, courts will
often cite an arbitration rule's variance from the Protocol as proof that a
rule is unbalanced, and therefore, unenforceable. 20 9 The AnheuserBusch program does not contain any of the unbalanced provisions that
often render an arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Anheuser-Busch appears to have developed a model dispute
resolution program and demonstrates how a company can implement a

fees, but does not require them.

This was one of the features of the Brown & Root program.

BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION supra note 1, at 109.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 108 and 124 and accompanying text.
PROTOCOL, supra note 191.
See supra Parts IV.C.2 and LV.C.3.
PROTOCOL, supranote 191.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Compare PROTOCOL, supra note 192, with CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63.
CompareRULES, supra note 192, with CURRENT DRP POLICY, supra note 63.
Interview with Richard R. Ross, supra note 42.
RULES, supra note 192.
Bales, supra note 191, at 179.
Id. at 180.
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compulsory arbitration system. Procedurally, the company ensures that
the program is meticulously fair to employees. Its financial contribution
to the process, its contractual promise of no retaliation, its commitment
to early resolution, and its provision of mediation are all examples of the
company going beyond the legal requirements of a compulsory
arbitration system. This demonstrates that the company's use of
arbitration is not simply a litigation avoidance strategy, but a
comprehensive dispute resolution strategy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examining the results of the DRP from both the company
perspective, as well as through the lens of prevailing ADR standards,
Anheuser-Busch demonstrates that it is possible to both meet the
company's goals, while simultaneously delivering a fair dispute
resolution process to employees. Indeed, the resolution of the vast
majority of disputes short of mediation or arbitration accurately sums up
the satisfaction of the company's goals. 2 10 And as noted in the previous
section, the program was developed and implemented with the necessary
precision to ensure that it was unyieldingly fair to employees. 211 The
resulting program ultimately fulfills the stated objective-"resolution of
workplace problems through a process that emphasizes fairness and due
'
process while minimizing bureaucracy."212
In doing so, the program
serves as a model program for companies and courts alike as a
benchmark for the effective implementation of ADR in the workplace.

210.

See supra Part W.A.

211.

See supra Part V1.
HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66.

212.
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